BCryptGenRandom 函数的理论周期是多少?
What is the theoretical period of BCryptGenRandom function?
我正在尝试使用 bcrypt.h
头文件中定义的函数 BCryptGenRandom
。但是,我找不到有关此函数的安全属性的信息。
BCryptGenRandom
函数的理论周期是多少?
MSDN 似乎没有提供此信息。
微软:
The default random number provider implements an algorithm for
generating random numbers that complies with the NIST SP800-90
standard, specifically the CTR_DRBG portion of that standard.
美国国家标准与技术研究院:
The seed used to instantiate the DRBG must contain sufficient entropy
to provide an assurance of randomness. If the seed is kept secret, and
the algorithm is well designed, the bits output by the DRBG will be
unpredictable, up to the instantiated security strength of the DRBG.
CTR_DRBG uses an approved block cipher algorithm in the counter mode
我们期望从 CTR_DRBG 输出的最大位数等于 2^blocksize。有趣的是,Campagna 表明我们无法区分 CTR_DRBG 的输出与真正的随机数生成器
The NIST codebook-based deterministic random bit generators are
analyzed in the context of being indistinguishable from random. Upper
and lower bounds based on the probability of distinguishing the output
are proven. These bounds imply that the security of the designs are
bounded by the codebook width, or more precisely on the property that
the codebooks act like a random permutation, as opposed to their
underlying security parameter or key length. This paper concludes that
these designs fail to support security parameters larger than the
codebook width.
我正在尝试使用 bcrypt.h
头文件中定义的函数 BCryptGenRandom
。但是,我找不到有关此函数的安全属性的信息。
BCryptGenRandom
函数的理论周期是多少?
MSDN 似乎没有提供此信息。
微软:
The default random number provider implements an algorithm for generating random numbers that complies with the NIST SP800-90 standard, specifically the CTR_DRBG portion of that standard.
美国国家标准与技术研究院:
The seed used to instantiate the DRBG must contain sufficient entropy to provide an assurance of randomness. If the seed is kept secret, and the algorithm is well designed, the bits output by the DRBG will be unpredictable, up to the instantiated security strength of the DRBG.
CTR_DRBG uses an approved block cipher algorithm in the counter mode
我们期望从 CTR_DRBG 输出的最大位数等于 2^blocksize。有趣的是,Campagna 表明我们无法区分 CTR_DRBG 的输出与真正的随机数生成器
The NIST codebook-based deterministic random bit generators are analyzed in the context of being indistinguishable from random. Upper and lower bounds based on the probability of distinguishing the output are proven. These bounds imply that the security of the designs are bounded by the codebook width, or more precisely on the property that the codebooks act like a random permutation, as opposed to their underlying security parameter or key length. This paper concludes that these designs fail to support security parameters larger than the codebook width.